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Abstract 
The codecision procedure has changed radically since its inception in 1992. At 
first characterised by inter-institutional mistrust, the codecision procedure 
today is used to settle quick political agreements informally between the 
Parliament and the Council. This new negotiation culture can be seen in relation 
to the growing number of informal first reading agreements between the 
Parliament and the Council, at the expense of the more formalised and time-
consuming second and third reading agreements. While this change entails 
closer cooperation between the Parliament and the Council, it presents serious 
challenges for the Commission, which has some difficulty acting in this more 
informal and more political environment. 
This paper argues that the Commission’s problems are due to its internal 
organisation being split in two – there is: 1) a highly political ‘top’ level 
including the Commissioners, their cabinets and the Secretariat General, and 2) 
a less political ‘bottom’ level with more technically-minded civil servants. The 
Commission now faces a major problem when sending these civil servants to 
negotiate informally with the politicians in the Parliament: they simply don’t 
speak the language of politics and as a result the Commission runs the risk of 
being marginalised within the codecision procedure. 
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Executive Summary 
The increasing use of the first-reading agreements in the codecision procedure between the 
institutions may not be to the European Commission’s advantage. This paper argues that the 
Commission’s difficulties with this procedure are due to the dual nature of its internal 
organisation: there is a highly political ‘top’ level of Commissioners, their cabinets and the 
Secretariat General, and a less politically-oriented ‘bottom’ level with more technically-minded 
civil servants. The Commission is now facing a major problem when sending these civil 
servants to negotiate informally with the politicians in the Parliament. They simply do not speak 
the language of politics, and sometimes lack the necessary skills to defend the Commission’s 
interests in the political negotiations between the three institutions. 
Because the civil servants in the Commission are not always able to negotiate effectively within 
the political climate, the Commission runs the risk of being left out of the loop when the co-
legislators choose to seal political deals via quick and informal first reading agreements, as they 
are now doing more frequently. Although the political echelons of the Commission are aware of 
this risk, some civil servants still find it difficult to adjust to this new negotiation culture. We 
would argue that the Commission itself must adapt all parts of its organisation to these new 
circumstances by thinking and acting more politically.
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1.  The evolution of the codecision procedure 
The codecision procedure was established as a legislative measure in the EU in 1992 
(Codecision I). It quickly developed into a vital part of the EU legislative process, and the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 further extended it to cover additional policy areas (Codecision 
II). In the most recent Treaty of Lisbon, whose future is somewhat uncertain, the procedure is 
foreseen to cover 75% of all legislative areas, including the Common Agricultural Policy and 
the budget. Codecision has thus grown in importance and scope since 1992. 
As the extension of this procedure has taken place, there has been a change in the way 
agreements are made within the codecision procedure. In brief, the number of agreements 
settled on first reading has risen dramatically in recent years at the expense of those made on 
second and third reading. This development has a number of implications for the negotiations 
between the three institutions, the Commission, the Parliament and the Council, since the rules 
that apply to a first reading are not the same as those that apply to a second or third reading. 
                                                      
1 This policy paper is based on findings obtained from 14 qualitative, semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from the three institutions. Besides officials from the Commission’s Secretariat General 
(SecGen), cabinets and DGs, interviews were also conducted with a former chief-adviser of Barroso, 
high-ranking Parliament officials, MEPs and diplomats both in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Danish Prime Minister’s Office and the Permanent Representation of Denmark to the European Union 
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In the codecision procedure, the legislative process formally begins when the Commission 
drafts a legislative proposal. Subsequently, the Parliament and the Council negotiate in order to 
reach an agreement on which amendments should be added to this proposal. For the proposal to 
become law, the Parliament and the Council must accept each other’s amendments. The 
Commission is often understood as a mediator and a supplier of expert knowledge in these 
negotiations. 
The negotiations can go on up to three readings, during which the Parliament and the Council 
try to reach an agreement. But if the two legislative institutions reach an agreement before the 
third reading, the legislation can already be adopted in the second or first reading. As the figure 
below shows, legislation adopted in the third reading (or the conciliation phase) is more the 
exception than the rule today, as more agreements are made on first reading. The percentage of 
first reading agreements has risen significantly since the former Parliament’s tenure (28%) to 
that of the last Parliament (64%).
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Figure 1. Percentage of legislative proposals settled on first, second and third reading 
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Source: S. Kurpas, C. Grøn and P.M. Kaczyński (2008), The European Commission after Enlargement: Does 
More Add Up to Less?, CEPS Special Report, CEPS, Brussels. 
The fact that the majority of the legislative proposals are now settled on first reading has 
numerous implications for the way in which agreements are reached – and consequently for the 
Commission’s opportunities to influence these agreements. The table below points out the most 
important differences between first, second and third reading procedures. 
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Table 1.  The three readings of codecision at various stages  
  First Reading  Second Reading  Third Reading / 
Conciliation Phase 
Text that is being 
negotiated on the 
basis of 
The Commission’s 
legal proposal 
The Commission’s law 
proposal + 
amendments proposed 
by the Council and the 
Parliament 
Conciliation text 
between the Council 
and the Parliament 
The timeframe*  No time limit  Max 7 months  Max 2½ months 
The voting rules of 
the Parliament 
Simple majority 
(Majority of the given 
votes) 
Absolute majority 
(Majority of the overall 
number of potential 
votes) 
Simple majority 
 
The voting rules of 
the Council 
Qualified majority or 
unanimity (depending 
on the opinion of the 
Commission)  
Qualified majority or 
unanimity (depending 
on the opinion of the 
Commission) 
Qualified majority 
The effect of the 
Commission’s opinion 
on the Parliament’s 
amendments to the 
proposal  
Effect on the Council’s 
voting rules
3 
Effect on the Council’s 
voting rules 
Commission as a 
broker between the 
Parliament and the 
Council 
The Commission’s 
formal right to 
withdraw a proposal 
Yes Yes No 
Formal meetings 
between the 
institutions 
No No Yes 
* The timeframe in second and third reading is in some cases dependent on whether the Parliament and the 
Council extends it. 
Source: Own compilation based on Article 251 of the Treaty on European Union, 2006, pp. 153-4. 
This tendency both strengthens and challenges the Commission. On the one hand the 
Commission’s position is strengthened by the tendency to make first reading agreements 
because – in contrast to the second and third readings – the text being negotiated is on the basis 
of the Commission’s original proposal. In the second and third readings the negotiations take 
place on the basis of the proposal as amended by the two legislative institutions. According to a 
number of our respondents the agreement is thus likely to be closer to the Commission’s 
original proposal if settled on first reading than on second or third reading, where negotiations 
revolve around a text that might look very different from the original proposal. 
Yet even here things are changing and are not so clear-cut. Some of our respondents pointed out 
that the Commission now consults the co-legislators even before presenting an official proposal 
                                                      
3 If the Commission does not support the amendments proposed by the Parliament, the Council can only 
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to the codecision procedure, in contrast to former practice. This means that the original proposal 
should not be read as the Commission’s preferences only, as to some extent it also incorporates 
the positions of the Parliament and the Council. So this new dynamic makes it unclear whether 
or not it is actually of benefit to the Commission that the negotiations revolve around the text in 
the original proposal, since even this text is likely to have been influenced by the co-legislators. 
Another condition that might strengthen the Commission in first – and second readings – is its 
ability to affect the voting rules that apply when the Council accepts or rejects legislative 
amendments proposed by the Parliament. If the Commission does not support the amendments, 
the Council can only adopt them with unanimity.  
Finally, the Commission can withdraw its own proposal in first and second readings should it 
want to, but only as long as the Parliament and the Council do not reach an agreement on the 
proposal.
4 
On the other hand, first reading agreements are conducted in much more informal settings than 
the second and especially the third reading agreements, but this entails new challenges for the 
Commission. Contrary to the conciliation procedure – in which formal meetings between the 
Council and the Parliament with the Commission as a broker are mandatory – there are no 
formal meetings between the institutions on first readings.
5 Furthermore, first reading 
agreements are usually quicker than second and third reading agreements, and since no one 
automatically asks the Commission what it thinks, it has to be quick to promote its own 
opinions in the informal procedures in order to influence the laws being adopted.  
2.  A new negotiation culture 
The growing tendency to make first reading agreements is closely coupled with the 
development of a new negotiation culture in the codecision procedure. On the basis of our 
interviews, we understand this new negotiation culture as consisting of the following three 
elements, which together contribute to the increase of first reading agreements. 
1) A growing openness and trust between the three institutions. This development is brought 
about by the fact that the institutions are now more used to working with each other than they 
were in the early years of the procedure. The institutions now contact each other earlier in the 
legislative process than before, where they would only negotiate face to face in the conciliation 
procedure. The Parliament has gained respect from the Commission and the Council, who have 
come to understand that the Parliament is an active and reliable negotiation partner. This was 
particularly evident in the negotiations on the Service Directive and the REACH-directive. 
2)  More informal negotiations between the institutions. Where the contact between the 
institutions in the early years of the codecision procedure was mainly formal, as it took place in 
the third reading/conciliation phase, it is now mainly informal and ad hoc. As mentioned above, 
there is no formal way of coordinating opinions on first reading so the institutions mainly 
negotiate via informal meetings, telephone and e-mail. 
3) A growing tendency to make political deals. There is a growing tendency to make political 
deals between the Parliament and the country holding the rotating presidency in the Council. 
                                                      
4 Our respondents in the Commission agreed that politically it would be very costly for the Commission 
to withdraw a proposal once the Parliament and the Council have reached agreement. The Commission 
will not usually consider this option.  
5 The meetings in first – and second – readings are instead conducted as informal ‘trilogues’ between the 
institutions. A joint declaration between the institutions from 2007 (European Union, 2007) lays down 
some codes of conduct concerning the trilogues, though none of these are formally binding. STAYING IN THE LOOP | 5 
 
The changing presidencies have over the years also come to see the Parliament as a reliable 
negotiation partner and increasingly – as soon as the Commission has made a proposal – make 
bilateral and informal contact with the rapporteur in the Parliament to reach a quick deal that 
satisfies the wishes of the Council’s presidency and the political ambitions of the rapporteur at 
the same time. The ministers of the changing presidencies often find it more convenient to talk 
directly with the rapporteur without involving the Commission. The rapporteurs and the 
ministers in the presidency are all politicians, unlike the more technical civil servants in the 
Commission who sometimes lack a political sense of the situation. The Commission is thus not 
always invited to these brief meetings, which usually take place during the first reading.  
3.  Implications for the Commission 
All in all, the growing tendency towards first reading agreements and the development of a 
tightly-knit negotiation culture has major implications for the Commission’s role in the 
negotiation process. The development demands that the Commission act more politically. In 
view of the fact that more agreements are reached as political deals between the country holding 
the rotating presidency and the rapporteur, the Commission has to be politically-minded, 
understanding which political interests are at stake and making sure that its own initiatives are 
in line with these political interests. This also implies that the Commission has to act quickly 
and flexibly in an informal environment: taking the initiative in meetings, setting the agenda and 
promoting its own opinions. The Commission has to ‘stay in the race’ as no one else will ensure 
its place there. 
According to a number of our respondents – both inside and outside the Commission – the 
Commission has lacked this ability to stay in the race of late. At times the Commission has even 
been left out of important legislative proposals because it failed to act politically and be 
proactive in the informal phases of the negotiations. According to the Secretary General of the 
Parliament, Harald Rømer, this was recently the case in the adoption of the afore-mentioned 
REACH-directive and the Service Directive:  
What happens here is that the Parliament and the Council [rewrite the proposals of the 
Commission] together. If we look at the two big cases, ‘REACH’ and the ‘Service 
Directive’, they were in many perspectives made radically different from what the 
Commission originally had proposed. 
4.  The reason for the Commission’s troubles 
As stated above, one reason for the Commission’s inability to act politically can be found in its 
dual internal organisation. The top political level consists of the Commissioners, their cabinets 
and the Secretariat General (SecGen), including the committee called GRI (Groupe des 
Relations Interinstitutionnelles) that coordinates the Commission’s inter-institutional 
relationships in the codecision procedure. The bottom level includes the civil servants in the 
Directorates-General (DGs).  
As the political level is generally aware of the need for the Commission to act politically, the 
Services’ primary focus is on the practicalities of the legislative proposals. There are many 
politically-oriented civil servants working in Directorates-General, nevertheless in principle, 
these two modes of thinking do not always merge into an ability to act as a corporate entity, 
especially with the increase of first reading agreements. An employee in one of the 
commissioner’s cabinets expresses the problem thus: 
… to be perfectly honest, we sometimes fail because our people don’t understand the 
political game down in the detail. They understand all the technical details, but the 6 | FUGLSANG & OLSEN 
 
political side of it, and how to act in the European Parliament, and how to act towards 
the MEP’s, is not always the Commission’s force. 
The two levels tend to deal with law-making from different angles. This compounds the 
Commission’s capacity to (re)act as a corporate actor and adapt strategically and coherently to 
the change in the negotiation culture – simply because different levels in the organisation 
perceive the situation in different ways and react differently as a result. Even though the top 
levels of the hierarchy have the political understanding required, they cannot control each and 
every bilateral contact between an employee of the Commission and, say, an MEP. As a result, 
the Commission risks throwing itself ‘out of the loop’ in the legislative process. 
Conclusion 
The Commission’s troubles with first reading agreements: its failure to adapt to the more 
political and informal environment, cannot be solved by giving orders or introducing sanctions. 
The lower technical level in the Commission, which makes up the majority of the 
Commission’s employees, must learn to think politically instead. We believe that this calls 
for a cultural change within the Commission. The Secretariat-General has taken some steps in 
this direction by publishing a guide with advice for civil servants to be more active and take 
initiative in the informal stages of the negotiations. This guide states, for example: 
There is nothing to stop the Member of the Commission in question from taking the 
initiative of convening a trilogue, where necessary, in which case it will be held on 
Commission premises. (Commission, 2008) 
However, even though the civil servants interviewed at the technical level had heard of this 
guide, none of them had read it. If a cultural change that stresses the importance of thinking and 
acting politically is to take place, the SecGen must make sure that the message is heard. 
Publishing guides is not the only way to convey this message. Arranging appropriate training is 
crucial for the successful improvement of administrators’ skills. 
As an alternative, some would suggest a redefinition of the Commission’s role and main targets. 
With a more efficient and active Parliament, which has proven trustworthy in difficult 
negotiations, the Commission’s role may over time evolve from that of solely technical adviser 
to political player and mediator between the political actors (i.e. the Parliament and the 
Council). In a recent interview the President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, 
emphasised the Commission’s “technical charisma” saying that:  
… the compromises between the two institutions that hold most power are prepared by 
the Commission's services, owing to their technical expertise in the different dossiers. 
(Riccardi, 2009) 
Furthermore, President Barroso rejected the idea of competition between the three institutions 
and had always been in favour of their respective autonomy. He argued that the EU as such can 
only be strong if all the institutions work towards the same objectives. 
Our investigation is in line with the understanding that the negotiation culture in Brussels is now 
much more open than ever before. Yet our interviews with representatives from the different 
institutions gave no sign of a more consensus-seeking climate; the relative power of each 
institution is still coveted. 
Barroso’s thoughts can therefore be interpreted in two ways: either the President thinks that 
Europe’s common future is best served by complete loyalty between the institutions, leaving no 
room for disagreements or competition between institutions. Or he has realised that the 
Commission’s relative position in the so-called inter-institutional triangle has been seriously 
weakened in recent years, and therefore wants the institutions to aim for the same goal in order STAYING IN THE LOOP | 7 
 
to cover for the Commission’s loss of political ground. If the latter interpretation is valid, those 
politically-sensitive and politically-responsible actors in the Commission should consider how 
the institution can regain its position by adapting to the new circumstances and thinking and 
acting more politically.  
If there is no change in the Commission’s political stance, and with an increased number of 
first-reading agreements, we are likely to witness a further weakening of the institution’s 
political standing vis-à-vis the Parliament and the Council.  
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